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Abstract
Accounts of video game play developed from an ethnomethodological and conversation ana-
lytic (EMCA) perspective remain relatively scarce. This study collects together an emerging, if
scattered, body of research which focuses on the material, practical “work” of video game
players. The study offers an example-driven explication of an EMCA perspective on video
game play phenomena. The materials are arranged as a “tactical zoom.” We start very much
“outside” the game, beginning with a wide view of how massive-multiplayer online games are
played within dedicated gaming spaces; here, we find multiple players, machines, and many
different sorts of activities going on (besides playing the game). Still remaining somewhat dis-
tanced from the play of the game itself, we then take a closer look at the players themselves
by examining a notionally simpler setting involving pairs taking part in a football game at a
games console. As we draw closer to the technical details of play, we narrow our focus fur-
ther still to examine a player and spectator situated “at the screen” but jointly analyzing play
as the player competes in an online first-person shooter. Finally, we go “inside” the game
entirely and look at the conduct of avatars on-screen via screen recordings of a massively mul-
tiplayer online game. Having worked through specific examples, we provide an elaboration of
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a selection of core topics of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis that is used to situate
some of the unstated orientations in the presentation of data fragments. In this way, recurrent
issues raised in the fragments are shown as coherent, interconnected phenomena. In closing,
we suggest caution regarding the way game play phenomena have been analyzed in this study,
while remarking on challenges present for the development of further EMCA-oriented research
on video game play.
Keywords: Ethnomethodology; Conversation analysis; Video games
1. Introduction
The coincident development of increasing network bandwidth with more powerful
computer technology has meant that online and “social” components to video games have
become a major feature of gaming itself and thus of research on video games.1 This often
has resulted in the routine concerns of the social sciences being brought to bear on video
game play phenomena, including interests in the culture of video gaming, social psycho-
logical factors of play, or economic analysis (Reeves, Brown, & Laurier, 2009). However,
curiously, research on video games has tended to take a somewhat disinterested stance
toward the “intricacies of skilled gameplay” (Reeves et al., 2009). In other words,
detailed studies of the players’ embodied activities are still scarce (Mondada, 2012, p.
236).
In contrast, ethnomethodological (Garfinkel, 1967, 2002) and conversation analytic
(Sacks, 1992) informed approaches—or “EMCA”—seek to draw attention to the
“gameness” of game playing. This attentiveness is expressed in the overriding focus
of EMCA work which delivers a corpus of investigations of play as it actually hap-
pens. For EMCA, the challenge is to unpack both the accountability of play as social
action and the ways in which it is practically accomplished by players—between play-
ers themselves, and between players and “the game”—as a moment-by-moment,
sequentially organized activity. The work we will explore seeks to provide a range of
descriptive, largely empirical studies of video game players’ naturally occurring prac-
tices, as they happen. It is in these senses—the sustained focus on play itself, and
attention to the lived detail of human action—that EMCA work on video game play
can provide novel contributions. On this point EMCA again stands in contrast with
the methodological approaches of the social sciences as they tackle video game play,
as this work has tended to rely on traditional social scientific instruments such as the
survey or the interview and other post hoc accounts of play that tend to eschew this
lived detail.
But what might EMCA’s focus on the socially organized practical details of game
play offer as a generative contribution to this journal? We must acknowledge the radi-
cally different epistemological positions of ethnomethodological and conversation anal-
ysis, with that of cognitive science (see Coulter (1989) and Button, Coulter, Lee, and
Sharrock (1995) for detailed ethnomethodological critiques of the concept of
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cognition). At the same time, we can discern a number of common features. First,
there is a common interest in focusing on actual play, such as examining players’
material engagements with a game’s “mechanics,” which is reflected, for example, in
Kirsh’s (1995, p. 62) work on the “interactional computation” of players in the
manipulation of Tetris puzzle pieces. Furthermore, approaches such as distributed cog-
nition focus on social processes and methods of action by “agents,” and draw upon
similar ethnographic techniques to those of ethnomethodology, to collect data and
drive analysis of how features like “offloading” operate (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; Stevens,
Satwicz, & McCarthy, 2008). Second, EMCA’s praxiological perspective also has sur-
face resonances with elements of cognitive science and allied work. For instance,
notions such as “distributed cognition” (Hutchins, 1995; Stevens et al., 2008) and
“joint action” (Clark, 1996) emphasize the sociality of interaction, albeit as cognitive
processes, pointing toward the social and environmental “offloading” of cognitive rep-
resentation and computation. Indeed, theories of joint action and common ground have
been informed by some key findings from conversation analysis. For example, Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) heavily draw on Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974), but
they use formal experimentation based on cognitive theories thought to underpin the
interactional phenomena documented by Sacks et al. to build upon the “suggestive”
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986, p. 10) findings of conversation analysis. At the same
time there are key differences particularly in the kind of data employed as well as its
treatment.
In the broader program of the cognitive sciences, there is a common focus on (lab-
oratory) experiments to collect data to test particular theories. EMCA tries to work
with what is often referred to as “naturalistic data,” that is, audio and video recording
of activities in their original settings so as to focus on activities that are “naturally”
occurring (although see Lynch, 2002). The use of audio and video recording also
offers closer access to the real-time unfolding of action, that is, video game play as it
happens, moment by moment. This focus on examining real-time practices in detail
leads to a question over what standards or criteria EMCA employ to describe activi-
ties. While cognitive science typically works with external standards—that is, derived
from a pre-given theory that determines a range of matters such as what counts as
“success” in a particular activity—in contrast, EMCA tries to work with standards in-
ternal to the setting, that is, standards that are oriented to by the setting’s participants.
Thus, rather than considering cognitive processes of understanding game play by play-
ers, EMCA would not consider this a research problem per se but rather a problem
for players in the setting to work out using various interactional resources at their dis-
posal (such as talk). Or to put this another way, for the cognitive sciences, the start-
ing point is typically a particular theory—of action, of cognition, of sense-making,
etc. (e.g., the Kirsh and Maglio (1994) theory of “epistemic action” which has been
applied to video game play). This is then tested, refined, and studied (in that sense, it
is “top-down”). In contrast to this, EMCA’s starting point is with the activity, and it
seeks to advance rich descriptions of what might be said to adequately constitute
actions from the perspective of those producing them; the aim is thus to discover
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what is important and/or problematic for the participants (in that sense, it is “bottom-
up”).
It is with this contrast in mind—between those of participants and theorists—that this
study presents its examination of EMCA literature on video games, although the ambition
here is not to make any further explicit critical moves toward a detailed comparison with
cognitive scientific conceptions of games and gaming. Instead, our approach is to present
a data-oriented, practical exposition of what and how EMCA research explicates in video
game play.
In a wider context than just video games, EMCA research interests have already been
put to work examining a wide range of leisure activities, such as dancing and sailing
(Tolmie & Rouncefield, 2013). Conceptually this literature has also addressed pleasure
and enjoyment (Brown & Juhlin, 2015), both of which are frequently tied topically to
video game play. EMCA work has also explored more traditional games and the “work”
of gaming specifically, such as in Livingston’s investigations of checkers, jigsaws, and
other puzzle games (Livingston, 2008). Although it is hard to say that this research has
coalesced into as identifiable a program as distinctive as that of ethnomethodological
“workplace studies” in the fields of human–computer interaction and computer-supported
collaborative work (e.g., Heath & Luff, 2000), we can nevertheless locate in this litera-
ture something of a wider context for the EMCA interests in video games that are col-
lected together in this study.
Perhaps the earliest ethnomethodologically informed study of video game play
specifically is that of David Sudnow’s (1983) book Pilgrim in the Microworld,
which uses Breakout to investigate the experience of the video game player.
Breakout, an arcade game released in 1976, involves the player using a movable
“paddle” across the bottom of the game screen to bounce a virtual ball against
layers of “bricks” located at the top of the screen (which disappear on the ball hit-
ting them). Clearing out all the bricks enables progress to the next (harder) level
of the game. Sudnow’s account of this game builds on a prior work, Ways of the
Hand (Sudnow, 1978), which offered a “player’s” account of developing skills in
playing jazz piano.
The distinguishing feature of both books is Sudnow’s detailed description of a singular
and largely solitary pursuit of mastery at a technical and skilled activity. In the case of
Pilgrim in the Microworld he describes the intricacies of successful play in Breakout
from a phenomenological position—that is, just what playing the game is, and reflecting
upon the emerging organization of the experience of the skilled player. For instance,
Sudnow articulates his developing skill at playing Breakout in terms of a field of possi-
ble, projectable next actions that are opened up to him, or emerge, as his competence
develops. This includes the various novel strategies to get the ball bouncing against the
bricks at the top of the screen and, therefore, make progress in the game. For instance,
one strategy, discovered in playing, is to use the attributes of the paddle (and that it has
different “zones” which produce different angles of rebounds with the ball, see Fig. 1).
This learned strategy enables Sudnow to “[employ] the paddle as a switching device in
ways [he] hadn’t before.” The strategy also offers distinct anticipatory possibilities for
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the player: “I’m headed toward a long string of particular destinations. And with this pat-
tern underway I can now accurately anticipate each specific next location” (Sudnow,
1983, p. 191).
While Pilgrim in the Microworld adopts the perspective of a single player, playing
alone, most recent EMCA work focuses on games that are played together, or on situ-
ations in which a player is in some way “not alone” (e.g., online gaming). The studies
that concern us here span game genres and settings. In terms of genre, EMCA studies
have explored “beat-’em-ups” (Hung, 2011), sports games (Mondada, 2012), massively
multiplayer online games (Bennerstedt & Ivarsson, 2010), first-person shooters (Reeves
et al., 2009), adventure games (Laurier & Reeves, 2014), and racing, sports, platform,
and real-time strategy games (Aarsand & Aronsson, 2009).2 Equally, we find a variety
of naturalistic pre-existing settings or arrangements of video game play in focus, such
as in the home (Mondada, 2012) or in dedicated gaming spaces (Keating & Sunakawa,
2010; Sj€oblom, 2011). While there are cases of interventions that study the introduc-
tion of novel gaming circumstances for players (e.g., see Moore et al., 2007), these
are rare.
In terms of the resources that are drawn into analysis, we can also see a balance
between two tendencies of study. First, there are those that focus on examining verbal
and bodily action as “modalities” around the video game, whereby the play of the
game itself offers resources for this interaction. These studies tend to eschew detailed
analysis of what activities are happening on-screen because they foreground other phe-
nomena. For instance, they explore how in-game audio offers resources for talk, such
as the response cries of Aarsand and Aronsson (2009) or the language learning of
players in Piirainen-Marsh and Tainio’s studies (2009a,b, 2014). Although what hap-
pens on-screen is important within this work, the analysis tends to be driven by
Fig. 1. Paddle attributes when playing Breakout. Redrawn from Sudnow (1983, p. 190).
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actions seen to be taking place off-screen; as Bennerstedt (2008b) argues, this is a dis-
tinguishable analytic stance that uses “in-screen and off-screen events to account for
discourse and activities done off-screen.” Second, we can discern studies that focus
more specifically upon articulating the organization of virtual, in-game actions as they
are witnessed on-screen, “in the game,” such as the player-driven observable “bodily”
and “conversational” conduct of in-game avatars in virtual worlds (e.g., Brown & Bell,
2004), the accountability (i.e., the observable-and-reportable features) of avatar
formations available to players on-screen (e.g., Bennerstedt & Ivarsson, 2010), or the
manipulation of the virtual camera view in-game by players (e.g., Laurier & Reeves,
2014). While there are conceptual issues with the distinction being introduced here
around on-screen and off-screen activities (in fact they are broader analytic chal-
lenges), these will be put to one side momentarily and returned to in the closing
remarks.
2. The practical accomplishment of video game play
Rather than initially engage in a detailed account of ethnomethodology and conver-
sation analysis and their relations to video gaming, we instead provide an example-dri-
ven explication of the perspective to examine video game play phenomena as sites of
social order. We do this by drawing directly upon a series of fragments of data from
four different pieces of research: Sj€oblom (2011), Mondada (2012), Laurier and
Reeves (2014), and Bennerstedt and Ivarsson (2010). The selection and order of these
fragments3 has been arranged using a simple analytic tactic, namely, a gradually nar-
rowing of focus that assists us unpacking video game play in a staged, “tutorialized”
manner. In doing so we aim to underscore how it is that the practical, routine accom-
plishment of orderly game play is a persistent, pervasive concern of all “levels” of
video game play.
We can summarize our “tactical zoom” (and sections that follow) in this way:
• At first we deliberately take a wide view of video game play, considering how it
unfolds in (dedicated) gaming situations. On-screen action and players’ conduct are
situated within a broader ecology of the particular place in which gaming happens.
Spatial arrangements of multiple players, computers, keyboards, desks, furniture,
etc. also play a part in these multiactivity settings. This is illustrated through
Sj€oblom’s (2011) video-based ethnography of gaming in Internet cafes, where we
examine an instance of players talking about—in fact, analyzing—the strategy of
their ongoing game.
• We then narrow our focus somewhat to consider the sequentiality of video game
play as it is intertwined closely with talk—such as assessments of play—and bodily
action. In doing this we draw on an example from Mondada’s (2012) study of two
players engaging in a football game at a games console. In contrast with the exam-
ple of a massively multiplayer online game in Sj€oblom (2011), the fragment from
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Mondada is drawn from an example of co-located play in the home and thereby
underscores the tight, precise temporality of video game play and its sequential
organization with talk, embodiment, and gestures.
• At this point we shift our analytic focus from “outside” the game to “inside” it,
and begin to consider more of the technical details of play. To do this, we use a
fragment from Laurier and Reeves (2014) where a player competes in an online
first-person shooter but has a “spectator” sitting next to him with whom he engages
in talk about the ongoing game at hand. From this we unpack two key points
around the competence of players in scrutinizing in-game action for the purposes
of play (in this case, via “zooming” and “panning”), and the player and spectator’s
talk as constituting analysis both of the game and one another’s actions in the
setting.
• Finally, we draw in entirely to technical game play, that is, action as it appears on-
screen. This analysis draws on a 3-s fragment of screen-captured play from a mas-
sively multiplayer online game (MMO game or MMOG) as found in Bennerstedt
and Ivarsson (2010). Unpacking the fragment, we draw upon notions of the ac-
countability and sequentiality of in-game action, mirroring what we have found
“outside” of the game in prior sections as we unpacked the ordering of conversa-
tion and bodily conduct “at the screen.”
2.1. Play in places
We start, in a sense, “outside” the game itself. Games are played as part of particular
settings, and the spatial, temporal, and social organization of these places will be
resources for, and be offered further resources by, the play of the game. This means, for
instance, that playing a video game in a traditional entertainment arcade will be differ-
ently organized from playing on a console at home with a family member, even though
the game itself may be similar. The reflexive relationship between practices and settings
is a key idea to begin with, as the ethnomethodological and conversation analytic pro-
grams have concerned themselves with studying social action in part as practices that
“make a setting” (Sacks, 1992, p. 515). As Hung notes, this also means understanding
video game play in terms of “interactions that are situated in particular contexts and that
involve particular players, who have to deal with practical issues, including the action in
the game, the controller, bodily configurations, and fellow players” (Hung, 2011, p. 58).
There are two issues here: first, the reflexive relationship between video games and their
settings and, second, the multiple activities that accompany the game. All too frequently,
players are not just playing the game, but engaging in other things like talking about the
game, spectating while someone else plays, eating, stretching, or taking phone calls.
Game play is interwoven with other activities; that is, it is often inherently “multiactivity”
(Haddington, Keisanen, Mondada, & Nevile, 2014). These other activities might be tied
to the sequentiality of the game—that is, the organization of in-game activities or they
can be interruptive. Finding appropriate moments to interweave activities is a concern for
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players, although it may be less so for others with minor or no involvement in game
play.
The analysis we use here to foreground these issues is drawn from a study of video
gaming in Internet cafes by Sj€oblom (2008, 2011). This work examines MMO game play
and co-located instances of player interactions (although, of course, the major focus of
MMOGs is found in physically distributed coordination between players). Using video-
recorded footage of cafes, Sj€oblom explores a range of phenomena, particularly focusing
on play as a situated and embodied activity where resources on-screen are drawn into
sequences of collaboration between the physically collocated players (such as helping one
another).
The fragment we use here depicts players in a multiplayer environment with a gaming
“ecology” consisting of eight spatially distant computer screens, desks, chairs, input
devices (in this case keyboards and mice), and various types of games running simultane-
ously. Here, we will concern ourselves with the recognizability of action in the room pro-
duced in the reflexive relationship of the room and the gaming: the audio-visual media
on-screen, the spatial arrangements of seated players, and the bodily and verbal conduct
of these players.
In the data fragment, Sj€oblom (2011) documents eight players collectively taking
part in real-time strategy game (Warcraft III—Defense of the Ancients). The game is
being played across the local network in the Internet cafe, meaning that players’ ava-
tars occupy a shared virtual world for the duration of their play session but are all
looking at their own individual screens. Thus, what happens on-screen is also shared
across the room, albeit from different perspectives for each player. The players also
are distributed across the space (see Fig. 2 for a schematic), with one player, G, seated
a few meters away from the others (who, seated side-by-side, mostly have their backs
to him).
Fig. 2. A schematic of player and desktop computer arrangements in the space. Reproduced from Sj€oblom
(2011).
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In the fragment as illustrated in Fragment 14 (truncated in this study), player G is
seated in a leaning position while he plays the game (Fragment 1, top right). At the
start of the fragment, G is controlling his in-game character (his “hero”) and is about
to engage some enemies. After doing so (lines 1–2), his in-game character is set in an
“auto-attack” mode, which means it will continue to do attacks on enemies unattended.
At this point, G turns his head toward the general direction of player D (see Fragment
1, top right), then produces an analysis of the play being engaged in; this is an analysis
that in part draws upon what has been available to him of the other players’ activities
from point of view of his own in-game perspective. G formulates his critique of these
activities as a question (“but what’ll happen later when you get ganged”—i.e., ganged
up on and probably overwhelmed by enemies). G’s play is necessarily bound up in the
outcomes of other players’ activities, even though in some senses the players operate
“individually.” In this case the fact of D’s response to the question suggests some kind
of implication between G and D in some joint in-game project that the data do not
necessarily make available. Nevertheless, although G does not explicitly address D by
name, he uses a second-person singular formation (“du,” line 5) and indeed G’s utter-
ance is heard as implicating one of the players, D, who responds with a further ques-
tion of G (“yea, but why would I do that cause I use the ulti5 ?”). In Sj€oblom’s
original presentation of the fragment, the exchange here continues until D ultimately
rejects the criticisms of game play by G.
Fragment 1: A player of a shared game offers a critique of others’ play. Reproduced
from Sj€oblom (2011)
There are several key observations that, following Sj€oblom’s analysis, we may point to
underscore the ways in which video game play is both a situated activity and one that is
sequentially interwoven with many other goings-on—matters that include the utterances
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of players, their bodily actions, their actions on-screens “in the game,” and their spatial
arrangement in the Internet cafe (Fig. 2).
The first thing we may point to is how the player G manages different ongoing
activities. His leaning position, Sj€oblom notes (seen in Fragment 1, top right), is a
method for managing his engagement in what is happening “in the game” with respect
to other activities. Of course, what might be happening in-game is made available on-
screen in front of him, and his leaning comportment lets him engage both in this
action on-screen while, simultaneously, retaining his participation in the ongoing activ-
ities of his co-players who are seated mostly behind him. The leaning position he is
maintaining is itself thus accountable to the physical configuration of the group of
players in the room. That is to say, G’s bodily position displays his orientation to the
bulk of players seated behind and to the left of him (as if, we might say, there were
a “center of gravity” to the game setting and he presents something of an “attitude”
toward it physically). Moving his gaze toward these others, G displays a shift in his
participation, from his own in-game activities on-screen “here” to theirs “over there,”
as well as rendering the temporal opportunity he has located “in the game” as a (liter-
ally) visible object for co-players.
Critically, these activities go on as reflexively produced activities in that they are both
about playing the game and getting that game done as a socially organized matter—that
is, G’s game play is on goingly related to the other players and their comportment and
arrangements of desks, computers, screens, and so on. G’s activities take advantage of
the assemblies of persons, furniture, and equipment being particular distances apart, and
set in particular alignments. Features “outside” the game are important and meaningful
here for understanding the situation in which G’s bodily, and in-game actions take place;
to quote Sj€oblom, the player’s “placement in a gaming environment is not arbitrary”
(Sj€oblom, 2011, p. 112).
As we noted previously, the players here are not just playing the game but also talk-
ing about the game. Their talk is organized with respect to the proceedings of the
game. For example, after turning his head toward the other players, G then produces a
criticism of the strategy being pursued in-game (Fragment 1, lines 4–6). First, by plac-
ing his utterances sequentially after the rearrangement of his gaze, G implicates what is
happening on the other players’ screens across the room—as Sj€oblom argues, it also
shows how G is able to spot “on-screen ‘trouble’.” G “interrupts” himself, that is, he
latches “yeah right now” directly after “you get ganged,” and also utters this “yeah
right now” with a quickening pace of speech (indicated with angle brackets “>” and
“<”). This interruptive and rapidly spoken form of his utterance shows that he is able
to attend to certain kinds of actions co-players are engaging in in-game from across the
room. In particular, we can also see that G’s utterances build in a “relation to specific
on-screen events,” such as how G “reformulates the advice from a general query about
recurrent game states (lines 4–5) to a specific one related to what is happening cur-
rently (‘yeah now for example’, line 6)” (Sj€oblom, 2011, p. 113). In this sense, then,
the interwoven character of the physical circumstances of play, the availability of on-
screen action, the arrangements of the artifacts of gaming like desk placement in this
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scenario, and the utterances of players—it is within this situational whole that players
seek to be “observable and reportable (i.e., accountable) as being a player in the gam-
ing session as a whole, not just as a participant in the on-screen interactions” (Sj€oblom,
2011, p. 112).6
The kinds of concerns displayed in the strategizing of Sj€oblom’s gamers can be
seen in other EMCA studies of video game play. For instance, Hung’s ethnographic
studies of players (2007, 2009, 2011) focus in part on pedagogical situations of play,
such as examining how more competent and experienced players help a less experi-
enced one. Thus, in Hung (2011), we see more competent players producing analy-
ses of co-player’s actions as they seek to provide help. Their analytic work involves
producing articulations of various normally taken-for-granted, unspoken features of
their actions in the game, and to make those actions accountable for less competent
players.
Another relevant point of reference that speaks to multiactivity while playing and
the management of different kinds of participation is work by Keating and Sunakawa
(2010), who also investigate LAN gaming settings. In following the interaction
between members of gaming groups, Keating and Sunakawa document the various
methods deployed by players to manage their activities in “real space” and “virtual
space.” This includes articulation work (Schmidt & Bannon, 1992) conducted by play-
ers in the course of play: that is, players’ analyses of the game as it unfolds, which
they use to coordinate group actions between them, and to render coordinative features
of that action mutually visible. Besides talk, Keating and Sunakawa also document
how bodily posture, gesture, and the surrounding furniture such as chairs, are all
employed to juggle and show different forms of participation, such as marking when
game sessions end.
In closing this section, we now have some sense of the ways in which many different
kinds of action can be “at play” in a video-gaming situation. However, in this fragment
we have not examined what is happening on-screen in any detail, although we have
hinted at its use as an analytic resource for critiques of play occasioned by opportunities
made available by the game. What the following sections now do is to begin introducing
action on-screen and its role in the organization of play. In doing so, we will also draw
upon the different kinds of action that might constitute such a setting in increasing detail.
In doing so, we continue to explore these, and actions on-screen, as the practical achieve-
ments of players, and analytically as exhibits for us of the socially organized practices of
video game play.
2.2. Talk at the screen
In this section we start to narrow our focus to consider in more depth some of the
notions already highlighted in the previous section, but drilling into the coordination
of action in more detail. While we focus predominantly on what is happening “out-
side” the game, we explore a situation where both parties are engaged in the game.
In doing this, we also reduce the scale of the setting, moving from a larger space
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with many players, computers, and multiplayer activities—the Internet cafe—to a home
with just two players at a single games console and sharing a single screen (in other
words, the players have a “conjoint orientation” toward a “proper object of attention”
(Watson, 2005, p. 214). Furthermore, we consider a different genre of game: Rather
than an MMOG (which has been the main focus of many studies), we look at a foot-
ball game played on a game console. The kind of game played has implications for
the kinds of interactions “around” it: Football games require continuous and fast action
during pre-specified temporal periods of play, whereas MMOGs involve a more flexi-
ble tempo of activities.
To make this transition, we examine a fragment of data from Mondada (2012)
where players sit side-by-side while they play a football game. In many ways the frag-
ment we deal with is similar to that of Sj€oblom in the prior section; for instance, the
players here also share access to a great many resources featuring in the arrangements
of play—things such as couches, tables, games consoles, handheld controllers, TV
screens, and so on. However, in this section we wish to get more purchase on the
ways in which players very precisely and rapidly coordinate and intertwine the action
in-game with their bodily and verbal conduct in front of the screen (and vice versa)
as a matter of tight sequential organization. In particular, Mondada draws attention to
players’ verbal and bodily assessments of in-game actions. We also see an alternative
use of video here to Sj€oblom. While video from the prior fragment had an ethno-
graphic quality and an ethnomethodological orientation to unpacking action, the frag-
ment from Mondada in this section offers a more strong sequential (i.e., conversation
analytic) approach that employs video recordings to establish emerging and reflexive
relationship between features of playing the game (e.g., actions happening on screen,
verbal, and bodily conduct).
In her studies of gaming, Mondada (2011, 2012, 2013) has examined video record-
ings of players sitting side-by-side as they play together using a games console. In
the fragment (Fragment 2) drawn from Mondada (2012) we see a transcription7 of
the interplay between different forms of action by players—their utterances, gestures,
gaze, and the conduct of play as it unfolds moment-by-moment on-screen. In the
fragment we are concerned with, two players—Luc and Raph—are taking part in a foot-
ball video game (Fifa ‘08) together as they jointly compete with other players online.
Luc and Raph are on the same team in the football match the fragment is drawn from,
while they compete with other, online players. As we join the fragment, Luc is moving
the avatar he is controlling on-screen continuously toward the goal (he has possession of
the ball). As he makes this move with the avatar (illustrated in the top right of the tran-
script), his co-player Raph utters “you score it” (line 1) after which Luc does indeed
score the goal for their team. Almost simultaneously Luc and Raph then both produce
bodily and verbal “responses” to this goal: They produce overlapped utterances of “huh”
and “good,” start turning their torsos toward one another, and finally engage in a mutual
gaze and handshake.
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Fragment 2: Luc and Raph playing Fifa ‘08 together. Reproduced from Mondada (2012)
   luc >>luc is running towards the goal w. the ball# --> 
   fig                                              #fig.4 
4
1  RAP tu le mets hein, 
 you score it PART, 
2 (1.+5)+ 
   luc  ->+luc scores the goal for Real Madrid+ 
3  LUC *[Hu+h
4  RAP *[bi+en[::] 
  [good[::
 *.....turns to LUC--> 
   luc     +.....turns to RAP--> 
5  LUC       [voi]#:l*+à: # 
       [here] it is: 
            -->*+mutual gaze and handshaking--> 
   fig           #fig.5   #fig.6 
5 6
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We can immediately see that there is a closely managed sequential relevance to the
production of in-game actions, talk-as-action, and bodily actions: Each is neatly meshed
with the ongoing play in ways that mutually elaborate (i.e., take their sense from) one
another in their placement within the sequential order. This is much the same as the prior
fragment, except the temporal “closeness” or “tightness” of the sequential links between
elements is high.
Unpacking this, we can see that Raph’s first utterance “you score it” (Fragment 2,
line 1) is produced while both parties are looking at the screen, instructing Luc what
to do next. After the goal, which results in a pause in play, we see a “rearrangement”
in Raph and Luc’s utterances (lines 3 and 4) and a shift toward compliments being
given (Raph: “good,” line 4). As Mondada points out, different forms of talk are per-
sistently employed by players in a way that is sensitive to, organized with, and
“geared into” what is happening “in the game” and the sequential implications of these
moments for the production of particular kinds of utterances (like praise in this case).
In other words, the sequential position of player talk in the fragment is tied to the
kind of action that it is/does. In particular, we can find one form of utterances (e.g.,
directives) while engaged in the game, and forms of utterances (such as compliments)
during “breaks” in the game: “during the game, directives, instructions, and requests
are common [. . .]; when the game is suspended, assessments of past action, along with
compliments or blames and complaints are the most frequent [verbal] actions” (Mon-
dada, 2012, p. 244).
Mondada describes how the in-game action—the maneuverings of Luc’s in-game foot-
ball team character and the goal he scores—“immediately generates a change in posture
of the participants” (Mondada, 2012, p. 244). In the prior section, we saw how the
arrangement of a single player in their chair and the shifting alignment of head direction
and gaze was built into utterances and on-screen activities toward a group of players else-
where. Here, we now see the sequential organization of bodily actions of two players
around a shared screen. In particular, we can observe how players coordinate their bodies
such that they are “geared in” very precisely to the temporal flow of actions on-screen
and talk. Players’ conduct displays mutual coordination between the players while they
produce bodily action: for instance, turning toward one another in lines 3 and 4 (with ini-
tiations of a mutual “body torque” in Fragment 2 indicated with “+” and “*”) and engag-
ing in gaze alignments that switch away from the screen and toward the other player
(line 5).
Simple but exquisitely timed sequences actions constitute individual players’ own
analyses; analysis that is not a purely cognitive phenomenon (hidden inside a player’s
head), but that is visible through the unfolding actions on the screen (e.g., whether to
run left or right; stop or continue running). Consequently, through their on-screen
actions, players can build up a shared understanding of the ongoing game activity.
Put another way, the players display in, and through, their torqueing of torsos and
changes in forms of talk that they are both oriented toward this point in the sequence
as an opportunity for further actions to take place away from the focus of the screen.
Mondada comments on this, arguing that “suspensions of the game occasion social
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actions that are still related to the game, but in a retrospective way: whereas
exchanges during the game are coordinated timely within the temporality of the foot-
ball moves by the participants sitting side-by-side and concentrating on the TV moni-
tor, comments about the game are voiced when the game is paused and within an
interaction based on their reorientation face-to-face” (Mondada, 2012, p. 245). We see
similar bodily moves employed in other gaming situations, such as LAN game set-
tings, where bodily posture may be employed as a resource in structuring game play
(Keating & Sunakawa, 2010).
In summary, then, the players’ body torque and general physical positioning—with
respect to one another, the game controllers, and the screen—are organized closely with
the proceedings of the game and their talk. We have seen here how the activities of
players on-screen—the orderly nature of which we have analyzed in prior sections—are
necessarily embedded in the concerted production of talk and bodily conduct at the site
of play. Physical conduct such as gesture and bodily comportment is continuously
unfolding and subject to continuous mutual monitoring—that is, to say that it is pro-
duced so as to be readily analyzable to others—or as we might also say, as accountable
actions.
The approach here is consonant with other more conversation analytic research on
video game play. For instance, Piirainen-Marsh (2012) and Piirainen-Marsh and Tai-
nio (2009a,b, 2014) examine in-game text as a resource for talk.8 Piiranien-Marsh
and Tainio look at the ways in which in-game, on-screen text content and “utter-
ances” (such as audible narration) can operate as conversational resources for play-
ers’ interactions around the game. Employing video recordings of adventure games
played within a domestic setting, their analysis unpacks the sequentiality of talk and
ways in which the in-game text or voice content becomes a matter for sequential
organization. This organization is practically achieved via different types of verbal
repetition by players as they draw on this in-game “source material,” and this is
made accountable to the ongoing talk environment (Piirainen-Marsh & Tainio,
2009a), and how epistemic positions (e.g., how much a player knows about the
game) play a role in such talk between players at the screen (Piirainen-Marsh &
Tainio, 2014).
2.3. Analyzing the game on-screen
We now shift the analytic focus toward the “inside” of the game. Of course, we have
already considered this to some extent, but so far this has been framed in terms of how
“outside” actions are related to what is happening in-game. Here, we begin to look at the
technical details of playing the game, finding ways to answer what it means to “engage
in a fight” or “pass the ball and score a goal.”
In performing this shift of focus we want to answer the question of how one
might “open up” the competences for playing the game for analytic scrutiny. We
will present two different ways of doing so. First, we use the presence of a
“spectator”9 on the game in this section as a methodological opportunity, as an
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ethnomethodological “perspicuous setting” (Garfinkel, 2002; Mondada, 2013).
Through talking to the spectator (and reacting to the spectator’s questions and
assessments), the player makes explicit many aspects of the game that would
otherwise remain implicit. In other words, the player in talking to the spectator
formulates (for the spectator, but thereby also for the researchers) many aspects of
the game that usually remain implicit, tacit, or unspoken. Secondly, we look at
how the interactive and collaborative nature of many games can itself be used as a
way to get “inside” the game. This approach follows work in conversation analy-
sis, which has exploited the interactive nature of talk-in-interaction, in particular,
the fact that a current speaker in taking a turn-at-talk displays their understanding
of a prior turn (e.g., in producing an “answer,” a current speaker displays an
understanding of a prior turn as a “question”). Similarly, in collaborative games
when a first player reacts to what a second player has just done, the first player
displays an understanding of the second player’s action.
In this section we take a fragment from Laurier and Reeves (2014) where a player
and a spectator jointly scrutinize and produce analyses of on-screen action of the collab-
orative online first-person perspective shooter Counter-Strike: Source. Briefly, Counter-
Strike involves two opposing teams facing one another at on a single game “map”
which is experienced as a complex 3D virtual environment. During play (rounds of a
game can last seconds thorough to several minutes), the teams attempt to either elimi-
nate each other entirely or defuse a bomb placed by the opposing team (and vice versa:
the opposing team is trying to protect the bomb from being defused, i.e., to eventually
explode).
In this fragment we examine a player and a spectator are seated at a computer
screen while the player competes on one of these game maps against other online play-
ers (Fragment 310 ). The player has a sniper rifle and is using a scoped view to look
down a ramp toward a tunnel to locate enemy players at the end of it (the scoped view
is circular as seen in Fragment 3, and in this case enables the player to inspect what is
presented on-screen in greater detail). Briefly put, the fragment consists of a verbal
exchange between the spectator and the player regarding what is happening in the tun-
nel. Specifically they are working out what one of the player’s teammates is doing
down the tunnel and what is happening as he encounters any possible enemy players
there (the end of the tunnel is a well-known “flashpoint” for clashes between the two
teams at play):
• the fragment starts with the player and the spectator noticing some movement
(“something going on down there”), displayed in Fragment 3, Panel 1;
• to get a better look of the tunnel, the player moves forward (resulting in a different
view, displayed in Panel 2);
• the player then zooms in further for a closer look at what is happening toward the
left side (Panel 3);
• finally, the player pans his view rightward to scan the tunnel (Panels 4–6).
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Fragment 3: Player zooming their scope into a tunnel. Fragment reproduced from
Laurier and Reeves (2014)
At the start of the fragment (Fragment 3, Panel 1), the player has just zoomed in and
“framed” his view to expose a small part of the tunnel in the center of the crosshairs.
The player’s zooming and movement at this point is conducted in a way to minimize his
visibility to other players while still retaining a view of the end of the tunnel (and the
movements of opposing players) (Reeves et al., 2009). At the same time, this zooming
effectively “frames the shot” (Laurier & Reeves, 2014) for the player and, at the same
time, “frames” the verbal exchange with the spectator which we see in Fragment 3’s tran-
scription. In other words, zooming and panning is analytic “screen work”—essential to
the play of Counter-Strike, and which constitute in themselves an ongoing analysis of the
unfolding game that provides resources to answer key questions like: Where are my ene-
mies? Can I see movement? Is that movement from an enemy or a friend?
As the player does zooming-in to the tunnel, the spectator also produces an analysis of
what he can see happening on-screen, namely, that there is “something going on down
there.” Simultaneously, the spectator is analyzing the player’s in-game action—his
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zooming-in (basically providing an account of “why is he zooming in?”). The spectator is
of course at the same time also providing his analysis of the player’s analysis: As the
zooming and panning of the player results is visible change on-screen, the spectator can,
in a certain sense, try to follow that analysis of the player. We can see his following in
how the player responds to the spectator’s comment with a laughter inflected “oh that’s
one of my te(h)am ma(h)tes,”11 in other words, he formulates the “something” for the
spectator: The spectator only saw that there was something in the tunnel, while the player
actually claims to know what that something was.
The camera actions and the formulation show the player’s visual competence (cf. Greif-
fenhagen, 2013) as a player of Counter-Strike in assessing, analyzing, and scrutinizing
action in the game. As a consequence of then not only which parties are the spectator and
the player but also what is happening at that moment in the game, there are certain kinds
of differential rights-to-talk and rights-to-report on what is “seen” on-screen at play. There
may then be a strategic vagueness to the spectator’s utterance here regarding “something
going on” (given that he might know but not have the entitlement to formulate it more
explicitly), and then later his formulation of an assessment of the action on-screen in the
form of a question (Panel 3), “is he hiding behind that box?” In this sense for the spectator
the accountability (e.g., recognizability) of in-game action—what we might say is “there
to see”—on-screen is different from what is “there to see” for the player.
The first part of the fragment has already given us an indication of how the player’s
visual competence (zooming) constitutes an in-game analysis, something that in this setup
is mirrored by the spectator. What happens next in the fragment within Panels 2–6 is lar-
gely a continuation of this: a collaboratively produced scrutiny of action on-screen. For
instance, we can turn to Panel 3 where the player switches to a higher level of zoom. This
is performed sequentially after his utterance “I think they got him”; in this way the zoom
as an in-game action is placed in a particular sequential relationship with the player’s
utterance. The point here is that the zoom is not just part of the player’s engagement with
the game but at the same time is a “clarificatory” zoom. It is clarificatory in the sense that
it provides resources for the spectator to then raise a question at an opportune moment
—”is he hiding behind that box?”—as the player’s crosshairs (fortuitously) happen to rest
upon the box after the zoom is switched up; not only this but it also implicates the
“movements and detritus” of a co-player who has just died (Laurier & Reeves, 2014).
In Panels 4–6, the spectator’s question initially goes unanswered and there is a pause
as the player pans rightward. The player performs this panning motion “alongside” their
verbal pause. This pause seems to be heard as “trouble” by the spectator who renders this
absence of an answer as noticeable by reformulating the question, saying “you see to the
left there was someone on the box.” The player then finally answers with a perfunctory
“no, he’s dead.” The point of note is, once again, to highlight the interdependence of
actions “in the game” that are available on-screen and player talk as an ongoing conver-
sation that analyses play “at the screen.” We might characterize the whole fragment as a
moment of disalignment about analysis of play between the spectator and the player
about what is happening “down there,” and the resolution of that via various means, of
which actions witnessed on-screen are used as resources (such as zooming, panning, or
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the appearance of avatar movements—and deaths—on-screen). These resources then offer
opportunities for various conversational moves by the player and the spectator in the
reaching of a resolution to seeing the same thing happening in the game.12
As we turn to our final fragment, we want to note that we have tended to still rely
upon more familiar interactional resources—like player talk—even as we take steps
toward the “inside” of the game. The next section now focuses entirely upon what is
available on-screen, that is, as a matter of what is available analytically to us from in-
game screen recordings only. Of course, these actions “in the game” are also actions that
happen “at the screen,” that is, embedded within courses of action that often may include
verbal, conversational forms of interaction, although in a way we are narrowing in even
more on the perspective of the solitary player. We also take a further twist on our notion
of players analyzing play. Rather than looking at a spectator analyzing what a player is
doing (where the spectator’s analysis is not game-relevant), next we see how players’
analyses of one another also take place as a matter of in-game actions. Interestingly, this
does not cause (in principle) any philosophical trouble to our EMCA perspective; instead,
ethnomethodology would argue that actions on-screen must necessarily be organized in
some way.
2.4. Player actions “in the game”
Here, we turn to look at how it is that the actions of avatars13 as controlled by players
are socially organized so that they are meaningful to other physically remote players in
the game. In particular, we wish to examine these in-game actions as in-and-of-them-
selves accountable and sequentially organized in much the same way as we have exam-
ined talk, bodily comportment, and so on. In a sense, we return to the first fragment
from Sj€oblom (2011) in which we observed a sequentiality in the relation between activi-
ties, except here it is very much within the activity on-screen itself. We will also con-
tinue to consider the significance of the competence of players in analyzing in-game
activities.
In our final fragment, we can draw upon Bennerstedt and Ivarsson’s (2010) study of col-
laborative action, or “team gameplay” as they put it, between players of an massively mul-
tiplayer online video game (Lord of the Rings Online). Like other studies by Bennerstedt
(with Ivarsson and Linderoth [2008a,b, 2010, 2012, 2013]), this work predominantly
examines the coordinative activities of players as they are made available on-screen. This
being an MMO game, the players are not physically located together (and in this fragment
do not talk with one another) but nevertheless group together virtually to achieve various
shared missions or “quests” so as to progress within the game. The fragment we are con-
cerned with lasts a mere 3-s in game duration and is drawn from video recordings capturing
the screen from the perspective of one of the players. In this short fragment, Bennerstedt
and Ivarsson describe how four players, distributed across the Internet, collaboratively
achieve the setting of a trap prior to an encounter with enemies who are located behind a
door, which lies ahead of the players (see Fragment 4 for screenshots of this).
In this fragment, the 3-s unfold thus:
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• We join the action as four player’s in-game avatars (Doromir, Eowyn, Gimlin, and
Saga) are running toward a large door in the virtual environment, behind which are
enemy characters (Fragment 4, Panel 1).
• At this point Eowyn and Gimlin are situated close to a staircase. The avatar Doro-
mir then starts to kneel (Fragment 4, Panel 2), an action associated with laying a
trap and resulting in a red circle appearing on the floor (Fragment 4, Panel 3).
• As Doromir starts to kneel, the other avatars (Eowyn and Gimlin; Sage is restoring
energy and therefore stationary) rearrange themselves to a position to the side of
Doromir before the trap marker (the red circle) appears on the ground. This rear-
rangement is visible in Fragment 4, Panels 2 and 3.
Fragment 4: Screenshots and simplified schematics of 3 s of play during Lord of the
Rings Online. Reproduced from Bennerstedt and Ivarsson (2010)
Our first point to draw from this is about the accountability of in-game action. Players,
in a collaborative game, do not simply “do” things, but they do them in such a way that
makes recognizable to others what they are doing. They can formulate what they are
doing explicitly in written text or through a verbal chat channel (“I am going to do X”),
although this is not always necessary or possible. Competent players find the intelligibil-
ity of action in relation to the current and possible next moves, strategies, and tactics of
the game (Livingston, 2006). Bennerstedt and Ivarsson observe that the actions of avatars
as they appear on-screen gain this accountability as particular sorts of actions for co-
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players via a “constrained set of possibilities afforded by the game” (Bennerstedt & Ivars-
son, 2010, p. 220). Being a competent player in the game involves recognizing what
other team members are up to without needing for formulate it in so many words. In this
case the players respond to Doromir kneeling in relation to the closed door they have
encountered as projecting some next action, and that next action is then made visible to
all by the appearance of a red circle as laying a trap (which is made sense of through the
strategies for laying traps in the game). To put it in other words, it is not just kneeling
that Doromir is “doing” as it might appear to a disinterested observer—the point being
that the avatar’s kneeling action gains recognizability by its production in a particular sit-
uation. To underline this, we can consider kneeling in the everyday sense: the contention
here is that “kneeling” is never a decontextual action—an action without a situation (con-
sider, e.g., inspecting a clue on the ground, delivering a marriage proposal, engaging in a
religious rite, talking eye-to-eye with a small child, etc.).
Our second point is about the sequentiality and the situatedness of in-game action, as
resources for players to recognizing current and projecting next actions. The ability to
recognize what someone is doing is not “isolated” (this points holds both for players and
researchers)—to recognize that someone is laying a trap relies on both sequential con-
cerns (e.g., “what was just done and what does that action make relevant as a next
action?”) and situated ones (“what is the game play in which this move could be
located?”). Underscoring this point, Bennerstedt and Ivarsson describe how the kneeling
by the avatar Doromir takes place in a way that is “sequentially and environmentally
positioned so as to relevantly do the job of setting a trap” (ibid., p. 220). First, the ava-
tar’s kneeling is environmental in the sense that actions take place in “a topology shot
through with meaning, projected as well as discovered” (ibid., p. 224)—for which, kneel-
ing in this particular location, with respect to the proximate door, imbues that kneeling
with an accountable orientation toward laying a trap (i.e., a matter that should be recog-
nizable to the other players). Furthermore, the avatar’s actions are sequential in the sense
that they are produced, accomplished, and crafted by players with a particular sensitivity
to what is happening now and what could happen next. The player’s analysis of other
player’s avatars movements is both retrospective and prospective. Movements also show
degrees of coordination of action and ideally understanding. Concretely, in this example,
we see Doromir kneeling just now, then Eowyn and Gimlin moving position, only after
which does the trap marker appear. The sequential proximity of Doromir’s kneeling to
these subsequent movement actions by Eowyn and Gimlin—that is, their movements
within half a second of Doromir’s kneeling—renders Eowyn and Gimlin’s movements as
a visibly meaningful set of actions that could be characterized as at a minimum respon-
ding to Doromir and more likely “getting into position.” Doromir’s kneeling at just-
this-place and just-this-time indexes a set of co-ordinate, shared projects within the game
that co-players display orientations to in their own subsequent actions. As Bennerstedt
and Ivarsson point out, first, the laying of the trap shows that a “fight is about to take
place [. . .] in this very location” (ibid., p. 220); second, it displays Doromir’s preferences
for the technique by which this fight will proceed (as Bennerstedt and Ivarsson describe,
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a “luring” strategy); and third, in and through these actions it also shows a level of com-
petence to co-players (that they recognize the action and respond accordingly).
Our third point to raise revolves around player competence. Unless one observes a
game of novices—who will often either not be able to show what they are doing to other
players, or who will have to formulate these things explicitly—much of the on-screen
action relies on an intimacy with the moves in the game. Recognizing a move for what it
is becomes a challenge for the analyst, who either has to become competent herself and/
or use a kind of methodological “trick,” for example, the position of a novice (Sudnow’s
strategy) or the presence of a spectator (as we saw in the previous section). On this last
point, if we wish to understand the organization of actions and how they proceed in video
game play, we cannot seek to disentangle this player competence from the production of
in-game action. As Bennerstedt and Ivarsson point out, “a competent player of LOTRO
can see even the early stages of this kneeling as the object it will eventually result in”
(ibid., p. 220) (emphasis added). The prospective sequential implications and conse-
quences of actions conducted by players are the player’s “phenomenal field,” that is, “a
world as that world is perceived from within lived experience” (Livingston, 2008, p. 65).
This is what we might call the “professional vision” (Goodwin, 1994) of the competent
player. To say this another way, for a competent player the actions witnessable on-screen
present themselves as situations imbued with various (possible) prospective courses which
inhere those self-same in-game actions with a meaningful, implicative texture (Liv-
ingston, 2006). Being able to “see” actions-in-the-game is what it means to be a compe-
tent player, while “seeing” this with others is what enables coordination to happen
between (suitably competent) players.14 For this fragment, avatar D’s apparently “simple”
act of kneeling is produced in a way that offers analytic possibilities for (competent) co-
players (i.e., it is reflexive). Thus, it is the players’ witnessable orientations to, and recog-
nizably purposeful production of a developing order before, during, and after the kneeling
which is the stuff of coordination between players.
In summary, we have first seen how accountability and sequentiality are resources for
making sense of the game from moment-to-moment, and secondly, we looked at how
competence becomes a methodological requirement for recognizing what is happening
and what will happen next at any point in the game. In other words, the activities of play-
ers “in the game,” on-screen, are conducted in an organized and methodic fashion by
players, who deploy a particular set of game-relevant actions that are finely crafted to the
pervading order of play for the given game at hand (Hung, 2011, p. 164). The organiza-
tion of in-game action becomes more apparent when we take seriously what to other
social science approaches might seem merely to be fleeting fragments.
To conclude this section, we can note that the characteristics of in-game, on-screen
actions detailed in this fragment—that is, the accountability of in-game action actions, as
actions that are also sequentially organized and environmentally positioned by players in
a purposeful, concerted way—are matters that will not be a surprise for researchers draw-
ing upon an EMCA perspective. We find that actions on-screen are produced and orga-
nized concertedly just as actions in everyday social settings are. EMCA-oriented work
inquires into members’ methods: how different forms of action are methodically,
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routinely produced by members of social settings in ways that are minutely sensitive to
the analyzability of those actions within unfolding sequential orders. In the next section,
we now broaden this point to throw into relief what we argue are the key ethnomethod-
ological and conversation analytic concepts raised in our discussion of the data frag-
ments.
3. Concepts in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis
Through diving directly into four fragments of data as we have done above, this study
has provided implicit instruction on the broad character of EMCA-oriented research. In
this section we want to give a more classic summary of ethnomethodology (EM) and
conversation analysis (CA) through the cases of video game play to orient the reader to
the primary commitments of these perspectives (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1992) and there-
fore contextualize some unspoken assumptions with which the data fragments addressed
above have been unpacked. First, we describe ethnomethodology, then its expression in
studies of work, and finally turn to distinguish the program of conversation analysis as a
distinctive development.
3.1. Ethnomethodology
The term “ethnomethodology” was invented by Garfinkel (1974) and can be thought of
as deriving from three components: “ethno” meaning members of a social or cultural
group, “method” indicating an interest in the things members routinely do to create and
recreate various social actions, and “ology” for the study of (or the logic of) these meth-
ods. As Garfinkel (1967, p. vii) puts this, “Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday
activities as members’ methods for making those same activities visibly rational and
reportable for all practical purposes, that is, ‘accountable,’ as organizations of common-
place everyday activities.” Ethnomethodology, then, is the study of members’ methods
for producing recognizable social orders. Perhaps the most important assumption that
drives ethnomethodological approaches is the methodic and orderly character of everyday
activities that appear chaotic and messy at first glance. For ethnomethodology, that people
are able to understand each other (e.g., when talking to each other) and participate in
activities with others (e.g., such as playing a video game together) is an ongoing demon-
stration of the taken-for-granted, methodic, and routine order of the social world. Conse-
quently, ethnomethodology is not interested in “idiosyncratic” methods, but rather
“socially shared” methods. For example, in the context of video games, even a person
playing on their own is often using socially shared methods. Sudnow was not suggesting
that only he was using the various methods he described, but rather that “anyone” playing
this game would come to use methods such as the ones documented in Pilgrim in the
Microworld.
A significant concept in ethnomethodology which we have made use of in under-
standing game play is accountability. Simply put, the accountability of social actions
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refers to the idea that we—as members of a setting—are doing things in such a way
that they are seeable for what they are. For example, if you want to greet someone,
you may extend your hand in such a way that the other person can see that you want
to greet her or him. Similarly, in Section 2.4, when Doromir was kneeling down,
other players were able to see that this may be initiating the laying of a trap and act
accordingly (without Doromir having to announce “I will be laying a trap”). As Sacks
(1992, vol. 1, p. 237) puts it, “actions [are. . .] done in such a way as to be recog-
nized, so that the apparatus that can provide for how they’re recognizable can also
constitute procedures for generating the occurrence as a recognizable action, or set of
them.” In an earlier study, Brown and Bell (2004) observe how avatars of players
physically absent from the game are purposefully left in particular poses that are
accountably “indicating their unavailability for interaction.” The accountability of
actions is thus a seen-but-unnoticed feature of actions. However, accountability
becomes more visible when things go wrong. For example, Bennerstedt (2008b) notes
that in MMOGs assumptions between players who are otherwise unspoken become
topicalized or surfaced when “something goes wrong or when roles in the group are
negotiated.”
In investigating members’ methods and the accountability of action, ethnomethodology
treats people as analysts—that is, as practical rather than “scientific” analysts. In this
study, we have seen players analyzing one another’s talk, bodily actions, events on-
screen, and so on. Section 2.1’s fragment showed a player producing an analysis of play
through critiquing current strategies, whereas the football game players of Section 2.2
were analyzing whether the other player was in a position to score a goal (and acting
accordingly). The players in Section 2.3 discussed contrasting analyses of what was hap-
pening down the end of the tunnel, while the players controlling avatars in Section 2.4
displayed their analysis of what other players were doing through performing appropriate
next actions.
Ethnomethodology then means studying the methods of players (Garfinkel, 1967, p.
31). But how could this be done? For our purposes, it is helpful to distinguish two
slightly different approaches to answering this question: ethnomethodological “studies of
work” and the program of conversation analysis (also sometimes referred to as sequential
analysis).
3.2. Ethnomethodological studies of work
One of the key expressions of ethnomethodology is found in its concern for studying
“work”—not necessarily work per se but rather the “work” of social organization (But-
ton, Crabtree, Rouncefield, & Tolmie, 2015; Garfinkel, 1986; Rouncefield & Tolmie
2011). This kind of study is, in a sense, often similar to traditional ethnographies,
although nowadays often accompanied by the use of video recordings. However, we
point to two crucial concerns that distinguish ethnomethodological studies of work. The
first of these is the ethnomethodological preoccupation with the how rather than why of
this work. For video games we have asked what this work consists of; that is, how the
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playing of video games is practically accomplished by players. By recourse to fragments
of data we have drawn the details of this accomplishment out. We have seen how players
use a range of available resources in this: the screen, their bodies, their utterances, the
physical arrangement of furniture, etc. An ethnomethodological study of games as work
seeks to describe players’ work in detail rather than finding ways to explain human
action through abstract theorizing and fixed social features. Consequently, ethnomethod-
ologists often put the word “doing” in front of the activity they are interested in (Church-
ill, 1971), from “doing gender” (West & Zimmerman, 1987) to “doing aggression”
(Bennerstedt et al., 2012).
A second ethnomethodological concern we have presented through the fragment is
with competence. This is twofold in that there is a concern for explicating the compe-
tence of members—that is, in the doing of their analytic work, such as that involved in
game play—but at the same, it is also a methodological requirement on the part of the
ethnomethodologist to appreciate this competence from “within,” that is, to develop a
suitable competence themselves. Just as the anthropologist studying a foreign culture is
supposed to familiarize themselves with that culture (by learning to speak the language,
engage in their customs, etc.), the ethnomethodologist is supposed to learn how to do the
particular activity that they are studying. One of the main payoffs of this requirement is
that researchers can then make direct sense of the things that they are observing, rather
than having to rely on “informers” who tell them what is “really” going on (cf., Lynch
and Sharrock, 2003, pp. xxiii–xxiv).
Just “how much” competence is needed is a question that is much discussed in the
ethnomethodological literature and tied to the particular research question. Sudnow’s
reflection on his experiences with Breakout and his acquisition of skilful ways of play-
ing the game (and prior to this, piano in Ways of the Hand) offers a particularly vivid
example of an adherence to this policy of competence. In contrast, the presence of a
less experienced player as spectator in Section 2.3 was used as methodological “trick”
to get the more competent player to articulate some of the taken-for-granted aspects of
playing.
We might ask why ethnomethodological studies insist on the importance of this
acquisition of competence. One of the key critiques ethnomethodology makes of
wider sociology is that it has tended to focus on the surroundings of the phenomena
of interest rather than the phenomena itself. Garfinkel and Wieder (1992, p. 203)
refer to this as the “missing what” of sociological studies of work, which tend to
focus on matters such as “the division of labour, on work roles, role relationships,
careers, and the like” (Strauss, Fagerhaugh, Suczek, & Wiener, 1985, p. xi), but not
actually the fact that the work is, say, cooking, truck driving, or playing a video
game (see also Button et al. [2015, Chapter 6]). Sudnow’s personal phenomenological
account of what it means to play Breakout as we find it in Pilgrim in the Micro-
world can therefore be seen as a response to Garfinkel and Wieder’s complaint; Sud-
now explicates what it means to pursue competence in a game so as to deliver this
“missing what” analytically.
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3.3. Conversation analysis
Distinct from and yet closely related to workplace studies, conversation analysis is a
program which at least initially was closely tied to ethnomethodology. Following pioneer-
ing work by Sacks and his contemporaries (e.g., see Sacks, 1992; Sacks et al., 1974), CA
investigated the organization of talk-in-interaction. CA’s initial interest was not so much
in a particular subject matter (“conversation”), but the use of its features to organize
action (e.g., the myriad uses of the turn-taking machinery by speakers). CA also became
more and more devoted to “naturally occurring data,” which was made possible through
the availability of tape recorders (Sacks, 1984, p. 26). These tape recordings had the
advantage that they could be subjected to close scrutiny and shared with other researchers
who could then see whether a proposed analysis made sense or not. In that sense, Sacks
aimed to developed a “primitive natural science” (Lynch & Bogen, 1994).
While ethnomethodology and CA share a great many concepts, here we can point to a
few tendencies which have been pursued by CA particularly and bear upon our analysis
of the fragments. The first of these is CA’s emphasis on the interactional nature of many
activities and their sequential organization, such that CA is sometimes viewed as synony-
mous with “sequential analysis” (Macbeth, 2007). The basic insight is that a participant
producing a particular turn-at-talk is thereby simultaneously displaying an understanding
of a prior turn-at-talk. That is to say, in uttering something that can be heard as an “an-
swer,” one is simultaneously showing that one understood the previous turn as a “ques-
tion” (i.e., something that would be referred to by ethnomethodology as the “reflexivity”
of action) while also “answering the question.”
CA has proceeded to explore the sequential organization of talk in a great many ways.
Although talk remains a focal point for CA, its concern for sequentiality has also led
beyond talk, to embodied non-verbal interaction (as we saw in Section 2.2, for instance).
Sequentiality has consequences for interaction as it unfolds both in and around the game.
Thus, in Section 2.1 the player’s turn toward other co-players (i.e., as an inspection of
their screens) was sequentially prior to his formulating of a critique of in-game strategy,
enabling that critique to be heard as an analysis of on-screen action. In Section 2.2 we
saw co-players changing their bodily orientation and the form of their utterance at a
sequentially relevant place (i.e., the moment just after the goal). Section 2.3 let us exam-
ine how a spectator formulated ongoing analyses of play that he used describe what (he
thought) the player had just done. And Section 2.4 showed the sequential implication of
avatar movements done “in response” to one of their avatars kneeling.
The methodic organization of talk by conversationalists and their analyses (and produc-
tion of) on its sequential organization also leads us to another key issue in CA that weds
together conversationalists’ analytic procedures and those of professional analysts (such
as academics). This is the methodological “proof procedure” that is described by Sacks
et al.:
But while understandings of other turns’ talk are displayed to co-participants they are
available as well to professional analysts, who are thereby afforded a proof criterion
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(and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn’s talk is occupied with. Since
it is the parties’ understandings of prior turns’ talk that is relevant for their construc-
tion of next turns, it is their understandings that are wanted for analysis. The display
of those understandings in the talk of subsequent turns affords both a resource for the
analysis of prior turns and a proof procedure for professional analyses of prior turns—
resources intrinsic to the data themselves. (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729)
A critical part of the “proof procedure” is its leveraging of the multiparty nature of
conversations, that is, classical CA research by its nature must involve at least two par-
ticipants—meaning that members’ sequential analyses of actions become, as a by-pro-
duct, available to the professional analyst. This is also at play in EMCA work on video
games and the fragments we have examined. Pushing away from the phenomenology of
solitary experiences of play found in Sudnow’s Pilgrim in the Microworld toward exam-
ining collaborative action15 shifts EMCA investigations of play toward multiparty situa-
tions and thus also explicating co-participants’ analytic understandings. For instance,
Section 2.4’s fragment of the kneeling avatar and sequentially relevant co-occurring
action reveals members’ analysis of the kneeling as potentially that. That one participant
in some interaction observably orients to another’s action as such-and-such an object
(like laying a trap) means that it becomes analytically available to the researcher and
establishes an analytic correctness about identifying those particular actions. However,
ethnomethodologists have remained cautious about the “next turn proof procedure” as a
“proof” rather than a further resource to combat the over-excited imagination of the
investigator.
4. Closing remarks
It seems that, after a long gap between Sudnow’s work in the 1980s through to more
recent interest in video games within human–computer interaction and computer-sup-
ported collaborative work communities from mid-2000s onward, video games are becom-
ing a legitimate topic of interest for EMCA. Not only has there have been a variety of
developments of video games (up to the more recent mixed reality games), but video
games have also increasingly been recognized as important cultural artifacts in their own
right. Coupled with the explosion of participation and sales associated with them, this
means that video games will remain of interest to many approaches beyond ethnomethod-
ology and conversation analysis.
This study has attempted to piece together the emerging body of EMCA-oriented
research on video game play and draw the potential contributions such a thing might
make for game research that is committed to the what might be characterized as “the de-
tails of play.” By articulating what these details entail, we hope our tour through EMCA
studies of video games offers hints of an alternative perspective on the constitution of
(social) action, and one that can help pose generative but critical questions for the ways
in which cognitive science work might approach the phenomena in future.
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A few closing remarks are in order. First, it is worth noting an inevitable selectivity
in the presentation made. Through re-presenting four fragments of data drawn from the
literature, this study has emphasized video analytic (Heath, Hindmarsh, & Luff, 2010)
explications of video game play which employ video recordings as exhibits of sequen-
tial action over other forms. At the same time, the study has deemphasized more
broadly “ethnographic” styles of research on video game play that offer less detailed
presentations of data. This commitment to the visual, video-recorded data does not nec-
essarily mean that findings are somehow substantively different from those emerging
from a more traditional observational ethnographic practice (e.g., see Hung, 2011)—ulti-
mately both should, from an EMCA perspective, be ways of explicating the “work” of
video game play using whatever materials support that work. There is pause for thought
here also regarding this emphasis on video and associated data collection tools which
are brought to bear for analysis; as Watson (1999) argues, video can be “used to illus-
trate spurious arguments and false problems: such data forms are not necessarily supe-
rior to others and may indeed deceive through their apparently persuasive power.”
Hence, an ethnomethodological perspective would argue that there is, in a sense, noth-
ing inherent “in” video data but rather should be approached as “aids to the sluggish
imagination” so as to “produce reflections through which the strangeness of an obsti-
nately familiar world can be detected” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 38) or, as Sacks put it, “we
can start with things that are not currently imaginable, by showing that they happened”
(Sacks, 1984, p. 25).
The work examined in this study also suggests some unexplored possibilities for future
research. For example, we might consider in greater detail how the role of the spatial
arrangements of the setting can shape the ways in which games are played. The study
has highlighted just two contrasting examples. At one end there are Sj€oblom’s studies
(2008, 2011) of interaction with and around the desktop computer games played in public
Internet cafes, where players sit in front of their own desktop computer which may be
located some distance away from others. In this work we saw how the organization of
desks, chairs, screens, etc. provide for certain kinds of interactions, particular opportuni-
ties for glances between screens, etc. to unfold. In comparison, we can see how Mon-
dada’s work (2011, 2012, 2013) closely examines video game console play where players
sit closely side-by-side on a couch, sharing the same screen. This provides for very differ-
ent kinds of embodied actions between players, different ways in which players mutually
monitor one another’s activities, and quite different notions of what it means to “play
together.” The space of possibilities here is very wide given the diversity of play arrange-
ments that exist in the gaming world. Beyond this we might also point to other sites of
play which are currently unexplored from an EMCA perspective, such as live streaming
or competitive video gaming (“e-sports”). Equally we could consider sites where alterna-
tive forms of game controller are in use, for instance, body-based gaming (e.g., gestural
controllers like the Nintendo Wii or whole-body interaction devices like Microsoft’s
Kinect).
There are also serious analytic challenges ahead. The “tactical zoom” employed in this
study has enabled us to shed light on how in-game actions are socially ordered and
28 S. Reeves, C. Greiffenhagen, E. Laurier / Topics in Cognitive Science (2016)
accountable just as all social actions are. However, in the course of this, we have also
constructed a set of analytically troublesome dichotomies which are often echoed in the
EMCA literature on video games, such as on-screen/off-screen, virtual world/everyday
world, in-game action/action outside the game, bodily action/verbal action, and so on.
We should be cautious about introducing such distinctions, however, as they can be an
artifactual analytic approach that reflects a conflation of the analyst’s and member’s per-
spectives on the action (Watson, 1999). Put simply, players do not appear to necessarily
concern themselves with “modalities” or distinctions at all—rather, they employ whatever
interactional resources are available to get the job done, that is, to play the game. Indeed,
there may be distinctions made between on- and off-screen, but this is a matter for mem-
bers of the setting (e.g., when they might draw attention to the “screen-ness of the
screen” as a matter of relevant account; Introna and Ilharco, 2006). This means that there
really may be no easy separation between, say, on-screen and off-screen except that pro-
duced by our own analytic work and data collection capabilities. While several of the
studies highlighted in this study do of course entail examinations of interaction between
physically collocated players (e.g., Hung, 2011), we find few actually attempting to elimi-
nate these distinctions where they do not pertain to distinctions topicalized by players
themselves (such as referring to “your screen” vs. “my screen”; Keating & Sunakawa,
2010).
Thus, future EMCA studies of video gaming might look to move beyond the conve-
nient shearing off of “constituent” forms of action in video game play (on-screen, bodily,
verbal, etc.) and start to examine these as an analytic gestalt; that is, seeking new ways
to exhibit the practical interweaving of and interdependence between different forms of
orderly action. As a product of transcription practices, this mirrors the troubles found in
building rich descriptions of bodily conduct that conversation analysis has encountered as
it extends toward ever more “multimodal” approaches. Compounding this is the unique
challenges of video game play, which involves a richly complex audio-visual resource—
the play witnessable on-screen—that presents sophisticated graphics and sound, which
often involve 3D virtual environments, intricate user interfaces, complex overlaid infor-
mation, and careful sound design. These “expert interfaces” often resist the analytic focus
leading either to them mostly being glossed away, or omitted entirely in favor of analyses
of talk or bodily action (or the converse: the action on-screen takes precedence). Detailed
analyses of in-game action are still rare, with the work of Bennerstedt and Ivarsson
(2010) providing one of the few instances of an attempt to address such in-game activi-
ties as fundamentally socially organized phenomena, although very much a “first step” in
this regard. The tactical presentation of fragments in this study has also inadvertently
highlighted this issue, where the nature of game play as a matter of rich audiovisual
experience for players seems to have started off remote but come to be more and more
in-focus, although perhaps at the expense of the surrounding milieu. It is the appropriate
integration of these different kinds of action (where analytically relevant of course) which
forms an ongoing analytic challenge for future studies of video game play in the EMCA
tradition.
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Notes
1. In this study “video game” is used to refer to a broad category of games includ-
ing games played on desktop computers, consoles, and mobile devices. However,
we restrict our interests within this study to more “traditional” forms of video
gaming, that is, console and desktop computer gaming. Analytically we will be
concerned with the situations of play in which we will not treat video games as
a generic class of interchangeable objects.
2. Besides these we may also point to a more comprehensive list of studies involv-
ing these game genres: beat-‘em-ups (Hung, 2007, 2009), sports games (Mon-
dada, 2011, 2013), massively multiplayer online games (Bennerstedt, 2008a,b,
2013; Bennerstedt, Ivarsson, & Linderoth, 2012; Bennerstedt & Linderoth, 2009;
Brown & Bell, 2004; Keating & Sunakawa, 2010, 2011; Moore, Ducheneaut, &
Nickell, 2006; Moore, Gathman, Ducheneaut, & Nickell, 2007; Sj€oblom, 2008,
2011), first-person shooters (Laurier & Reeves, 2014; Sj€oblom, 2008, 2011), and
adventure games (Piirainen-Marsh, 2012; Piirainen-Marsh & Tainio, 2009a,b,
2014).
3. The selection of literature here has primarily been chosen on the basis that it
engages with key concepts of EMCA in addressing the phenomena of video
game play, that is, taking a stance on social interaction as a matter of account-
able, sequential action that is accomplished moment-by-moment and is imbued
with a retrospective-prospective, reflexive character—all of these notions we will
explore in detail after the presentation of fragments. Besides the literature pre-
sented in this section, it is also possible to find related instances (albeit sparse)
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of research that examines video game play in ways that are somewhat consonant
with the EMCA perspective. For example, the symbolic interactionist studies of
Kirshner and Williams (2013, 2014), which explicate the “gameness” of game
playing via “gameplay review” where video recordings of play are used to elicit
responses from players as analytic accounts of their own play. The reason for the
distinction here is thus: An ethnomethodological argument might be that these
“gameplay reviews” are still post hoc descriptions of play rather than play phe-
nomena themselves. EMCA research would likely treat a “gameplay review” as
a fundamentally different object of investigation rather than seeing it a proxy for
video game play phenomena.
4. The transcription of talk in this fragment and subsequent transcriptions repro-
duced in this study largely follow Jeffersonian transcription (Jefferson, 2004). By
way of summary, pauses between utterances are shown in brackets (e.g., “(5 s.)”
or “(5.0)” for a 5-s pause), colons are used to indicate elongated sounds (e.g.,
(“a:” might suggest—in English—a slightly extended “ah” sound), gaps between
utterances with no pause or overlap between them are shown as a latch (“=”),
while overlapping utterances are shown with square brackets.
5. “ulti” is a limited resource for players, that is, it is something that can be used
by players but also “used up.”
6. We also note that G here employs the projectability of in-game actions and his
competence in recognizing these as such. That is, G uses his appreciation that
certain actions will likely take a certain future course—that is, as “projecta-
bles”—as a way of organizing his conduct in the Internet cafe space. Specifically
here he uses a temporal gap as an opportunity provided by the “auto-attack” fea-
ture of his character’s actions to provide some interactional “space” or “down-
time” to then shift his gaze away from the screen and toward his co-players. As
he does this, he takes advantage of his existing bodily arrangement, that is, his
leaning position. In some cases, such as those examined by Keating and Suna-
kawa (2010), furniture such as swivel chairs can be employed by players to aug-
ment such forms of leaning, or changes in posture or gaze (such as to project
something Keating and Sunakawa describe as “instability” or possible in-game
trouble, which then may be brought into verbal accounts of play). In orienting to
the projectability of play, player G is analyzing the ongoing, unfolding game; his
analysis enables them to see appropriate places to “take a break” and switch
activities, perhaps to talk about game strategies as we have seen here.
7. Besides introducing other symbols from Jeffersonian transcription (e.g., “↑” and
“↓” to indicate rising or falling intonations), Fragment 2’s transcription includes
further symbols, specifically the use of “+” and “*” to indicate where non-talk
actions start and end within a section of talk. For example, “*[bi+en” (line 4)
has two actions commencing as this word (i.e., “bien”) is uttered by Raph:
“*. . ...turns to LUC ” and “+. . ...turns to RAP ” (note that “bien” is also
overlapped using “[” with Luc’s “huh” on line 3). Arrows such as “-->” indicate
actions extending beyond the current line of transcription. The moment video
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stills are taken is indicated by the use of “#” with reference to the figure number
beneath (e.g., see line 5). For full details, see https://franz.unibas.ch/fileadmin/
franz/user_upload/redaktion/Mondada_conv_multimodality.pdf.
8. Primarily so as to analyze the interactional bases of language learning—in this
sense there is some consonance with Hung’s (2011) work regarding the study of
video games as vehicles to investigate associated phenomena, such as “learning.”
9. Spectatorship is an important and routine feature of video game play, both in a
mundane sense that others may sit and watch, particularly in home settings (Aar-
sand & Aronsson, 2009), but also in the sense that spectators may be part of a
formal arrangement of games as “eSports” (e.g., see Cheung & Huang, 2011).
10. In Fragment 3, speech bubbles emanating from the left are the spectator’s talk
while speech bubbles emanating from the right are from the player; speech bub-
bles position vertically indicates the order of utterances from top to bottom; we
will refer to Panels in Fragment 3 by number as shown in the corners.
11. The transcription here indicates that the utterance is inflected with laughter by the
player as indicated by “(h),” which Laurier and Reeves argue is accounting for the
player having been tracking his crosshairs on (what is now resolved as) a teammate.
12. We might briefly note that there is consonance with Aarsand and Aronsson
(2009) who also examine co-located players and spectators on play within home
settings, detailing how Goffmanian response cries (such as self-talk like “oops,”
“wow,” or “ouch”) are used by players and those spectating on players as a
method to collaboratively secure and sustain joint attention on the game’s pro-
ceedings. Of course, these response cries also have relevance as accounts of
players’ ongoing analyses of what is happening on-screen.
13. In this section we will refer mostly to the “actions of avatars” rather than the
more correct “actions of players via their avatars.” The shorthand is not intended
to ascribe any agency to avatars themselves but rather emphasize our stance
toward examining what is available on-screen only.
14. “semiotic fields elaborate each other so that, for example, pointing becomes
meaningful for participants in its temporal and spatial relation to other means of
communication” (Sj€oblom, 2008).
15. The use of the term “collaboration” here is not intended as a synonym of non-com-
petition. Rather “collaboration” is used to indicate some kind of practical coordina-
tion going on between players, whether this is a kind of coordination that involves
clear teamwork like repositioning while a teammate lays a trap (as in Bennerstedt
& Ivarsson, 2010) or coordination in purposefully avoiding enemy players’ sights
(as in the Counter-Strike example from Laurier and Reeves, 2014).
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